Another priority of the Burden Sharing discussions was the cost of keeping the U.S. military abroad. The largest concentration of American troops is currently in Japan (50,000), Germany (35,000 USD) and the Republic of Korea (28,000 USD). President Trump criticized the cost of these bases and argued that allies „should either pay the United States for its great military protection or protect themselves.“ However, America does not use its troops as mercenaries just to defend the territory of American allies. The U.S. global defense network enables it to respond more quickly and effectively to a number of global demands, including protecting U.S. citizens, preventing piracy, deterring violent extremism, and preventing illegal arms trafficking in countries such as North Korea and Iran. U.S. allies are working alongside the United States in all of these efforts. Exonomy-motivated demands for defence cooperation, while important, do not explain how States have overcome the information asymmetries that plague cooperation efforts. While some powerful and prosperous governments, despite the uncertainty, are willing to risk cooperating, the DIAC has multiplied far beyond the powerful and the rich. Even former adversaries such as Australia and Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina, as well as Ukraine and Russia, have signed DCAs. I affirm that when states sign DCAs, they reveal information about their reliability and design preferences to outside observers, and that these revelations, in turn, feed observable network flows.
As the density of the DCA network increases, network flows multiply. Information on the reliability and institutional preferences of potential partners will be more readily available, increasing the supply of agreements. It is important that networks are not only complementary. After the Cold War, they were the primary determinants of the new DCAs. These historical anecdotes correspond to statistical patterns. Chart 2 shows the relationship between CAD and a large number of defence and security outcomes. The graph shows that after signing a DCA, Dyads are more likely to contribute together to peacekeeping missions; Participate more in joint military exercises to cooperate on the same side of a militarized intergovernmental conflict (MID); less likely to fight directly in an MID; to become more involved in the arms trade; and to have more cooperative interactions in general, as defined in the Integrated Early Crisis Warning System (ICEM). The related work uses a battery of network selection and co-evolution models to address omitted potential variables, reverse causes, statistical dependencies and other threats to the conclusion, and finds that the baseline models shown in Figure 2 are extremely robust. Footnote 28 In short, DCAs have a strong influence on defense and security outcomes.
After serving in the U.S. Army for 36 years, Patton was a career soldier who served as a role model for his troops. He believed in his country, in his mission, and won the battles for which he was charged. He also knew very well how to motivate his troops to fight with him: a controversial example of negotiations between Singapore and Indonesia in 2007 is an illuminating example. In response to Singapore`s request to access Indonesian waters for training purposes, the resulting DCA contained an apparently benevolent implementation agreement that referred to an „Area Bravo“ southwest of the Indonesian islands natuna. Footnote 48 Almost immediately after the signing of the DCA, Indonesian politicians accused Singapore of dishonesty and began speculating on the „wide margin“ that the Singaporean army would exercise in the Bravo region. which includes naval exercises, air support, live fires and even the participation of third parties, which, given Singapore`s growing military might, would likely strengthen over time. Footnote 49 The Indonesian Minister of Defence, who takes over the